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Introduction 
 
With support from the U.S. Department of Labor, Verité carried out research on labor 
conditions in the supply chains of ten goods in seven countries from 2009 through 2011. 
Research was carried out on the production of shrimp in Bangladesh; Brazil-nuts, cattle, 
corn, and peanuts in Bolivia; sugar in the Dominican Republic; coffee in Guatemala; fish 
in Indonesia; rubber in Liberia; and tuna in the Philippines. The following report is based 
on research on living and working conditions in the rubber sector of Liberia, with special 
attention to indicators of forced labor.  
 
Since the establishment of the Firestone plantation in 1926, rubber has been the 
cornerstone of the Liberian economy; even in post-conflict Liberia, this commodity 
remains the country‟s most important cash crop.1 Rubber trees are cultivated on large 
company-owned plantations, where workers collect rubber year-round for a fixed salary; 
and also on small-scale farms that belong to households and individuals. This report 
focuses on rubber cultivated on large-scale commercial plantations that are not part of 
the Bridgestone/Firestone complex.  
 
Rubber has a long and controversial history in Liberia. Observers largely agree that the 
sector has served as a much-needed generator of state revenues and a creator of 
formal, salaried employment in a country with a largely subsistence agricultural 
economy. However, there has been persistent concern and tension around the terms of 
the contracts signed between the Liberian state and rubber companies, on the one 
hand, and the living and working conditions on Liberian plantations, on the other.  
 
It was determined that Verité‟s research in Liberia should be an exploratory study with 
flexible research objectives, which evolved into a study of current-day living and working 
conditions, with special attention to indicators of forced labor, on two Liberian rubber 
plantations: (1) the Liberian Agricultural Company‟s (LAC) plantation in Grand Bassa 
County; and (2) the Cocopa Rubber Company‟s 
plantation in Nimba County. The ILO‟s core labor 
conventions and Liberian labor law served as the 
framework for the study.  
 
The LAC plantation is one of the largest in Liberia 
with a labor force of approximately 3,000 workers 
(regular and seasonal) and a total population of 
25,000. This makes it second only to the Firestone 
plantation in population and workforce size. The 
LAC plantation is located close to Liberia‟s capital, 
Monrovia. In contrast, the Cocopa plantation is 
much smaller in size, with approximately 1,200 
workers and a population of 6,000. This plantation 
belongs to a family-run company, LIBCO, and is 
located close to the borders with Guinea and Cote 
D‟Ivoire. 
 
Locations of the LAC & Cocopa 
Plantations 
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Verité‟s analytical methodology used a dual-lens approach, examining data from the 
standpoint of discrete indicators of labor conditions, and additionally from the 
perspective of how the “five P‟s” – product, people, place, policies, and programs – 
contribute to or ameliorate situations of labor abuse.  
 
Below this report offers:  
 background information on the economy, politics, and history of Liberia; the 
rubber sector, its supply chain and workforce; and a summary of past human and 
labor rights concerns in the rubber industry; 
 the methodology and limitations of this research; and  
 a presentation of research findings.  
 
 
Background & Setting 
 
This section provides an overview of the rubber sector in Liberia, breaking down the 
analysis into the history and context of five key areas of inquiry of this study: the place, 
product, people, politics, and programs (the 5P‟s); followed by a brief summary of 
previous allegations of human and labor rights violations on Liberian rubber plantations. 
 
 
The Five Ps of Rubber Production in Liberia: Place, Product, People, Policies, and 
Programs 
 
Place 
Politics. Liberia‟s early history and legacy of war are important factors to consider when 
evaluating the history and development of the rubber sector in the country, and the 
impact of severe poverty and social and economic instability on the labor force and 
employment patterns.  
 
The civil war and subsequent political developments have created a complex and highly 
politicized socio-economic environment in Liberia today. On top of the tensions related 
to security, ethnic divisions, and fears of a return to conflict, the major political issues of 
the day around foreign investment concessions; roles of unions and other institutions in 
politics; and economic and development policy guarantee that inquiry into a major 
business sector like rubber is complicated and highly dynamic. Our research took into 
account not how previous and contemporary conflict is viewed by workers, but rather 
how the presence of these complicating factors in daily life in Liberia is “in the air” and 
therefore affects all elements of research there. Appendix 1 offers a thorough 
accounting of this history and backdrop, for interested readers. The most recent events 
are described below. The ways in which the research approach was adapted to meet 
the challenge of this operating environment are discussed in the Methodology & 
Limitations section of this report.    
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In August 2003, Liberia emerged from the devastating 14 year civil war with almost 
every institution and piece of infrastructure destroyed. President Charles Taylor went 
into exile and the country was ruled by a transition government that eventually oversaw 
elections in the autumn of 2005 that brought Ellen Johnson Sirleaf to power.  
 
A direct consequence of this environment of long-term and severe instability is that, 
while state institutions in Liberia have been reconstructed, they are far from functioning 
optimally. Liberian courts remain short of judges, particularly outside Monrovia. Police 
reform has been implemented, but while the uniforms may be new, many Liberians fail 
to see what has changed, with petty corruption still prevalent. Enforcement of labor law 
is weak. Education and other social services such as hospitals and health clinics are in 
the process of being rebuilt, but such services come at a cost (both formal and informal) 
and the quality is often low. Many parents, particularly in rural areas, think twice about 
sending their children to school because of the poor infrastructure, chronic under-
resourcing and lack of teacher training that often results in educators themselves being 
unable to read or write.2  
 
Economy . Measured in GDP per capita, economic growth in Liberia looks impressive at 
4.6 percent in 2010. However, Liberia is still rebuilding infrastructure and establishing a 
democracy following the long civil war. There is currently a UN Peace Keeping Force of 
15,000 in the country, whose mandate was extended to September 2012.3 Due to years 
of war, Liberia has high unemployment, low literacy, poor health, corruption, and a lack 
of infrastructure such as roads, water, sewage, and electrical services.4 Table 1 below 
provides key economic and social development figures for the country. 
 
Table 1. Liberia: Key economic and social development figures, 
5
2009-2010  
Economic growth 4.6 % 
GDP per capita 400 USD (estimated) 
Population 4 million 
Population growth 4.3 % 
Life expectancy at birth 58.3 years 
Infant mortality 79 per 1000 live births 
Unemployment/underemployment 85 % 
Literacy rate (females), 15-24 years 679.5 %  
 
Liberia has a primarily agrarian economy, with the majority of the population dependent 
on some form of subsistence agricultural production for their livelihood. It is estimated 
that almost 70 percent of the labor force in Liberia is engaged in agriculture, just above 
20 percent in services and less than 10 percent in industry.7 Chief exports in 2010 were 
rubber, timber, iron, diamonds, cocoa, and coffee. Of Liberia's USD 207 million in export 
earnings in 2010, 61 percent came from rubber. Liberia's largest export partners in that 
year were South Africa (27%), the United States (18%), Spain (8%) and Denmark 
(6%).8 
 
In addition to rubber exports, the country's main revenues come from its maritime 
registry program. Liberia‟s US-owned and operated shipping and corporate registry 
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(LISCR) is the world‟s second-largest, with more than 3,500 ships and 10 percent of the 
world‟s total oceangoing fleet.9  
 
Today, many of the companies that fled during the civil war in Liberia are restarting 
operations, such as Firestone and DENCO Shipping Lines. New companies heavily 
investing in Liberia include Sime Darby (palm oil), Golden VerOleum (palm oil), 
ArcelorMittal (iron ore), Elenilto, a unit of Israel's Engelinvest Group (iron ore), 
Equatorial Biofuels, Lonestar Cell, and Global Bank Liberia.10 AMLIB United Mineral, 
BHP Billiton, Affero, and China Union are all developing new mining projects in the 
country.11 Firestone and Buchanan Renewables, partially owned by Swedish electricity 
giant Vattenfall, have begun biomass producing operations using rubber wood (hevea) 
chips.12 
 
Rubber is currently Liberia‟s most important export commodity, and the five largest 
companies in Liberia operate in this sector. It is estimated that more than 20,000 people 
are employed by commercial rubber farms and up to 60,000 smallholder households 
are involved in the growing of rubber trees. Since 2008, the world market price for 
rubber and the quantity of Liberia‟s rubber exports has declined substantially. While 
rubber has other uses besides automobile tires, rubber demand is strongly linked to the 
health of the global automobile industry, which has been hit hard by the economic 
crisis.13  
 
Companies in the rubber sector in Liberia have reportedly been affected by the 60 
percent decline in prices and have cancelled contracts with suppliers, leading to 
cutbacks in the employment of contract workers. Estimates at one Liberian plantation 
indicate that up to 2,000 full-time and contractual workers have been laid off. The 
majority of those laid off were contractual workers.14 
 
Industrial Relations and Labor Market Actors. Labor unions in Liberia reflect the 
country‟s history. They were established late, experienced several problems, and for a 
good part of their history lacked the autonomy needed to play the role of independent 
unions. Currently there are approximately 30 functioning unions in the country with a 
total of 60,000 members. Most of these members are unemployed, meaning that the 
unions have little power and influence because they cannot meaningfully call for any 
form of credible collective action.  
 
All seven of the large company-owned rubber plantations in Liberia are unionized. At 
both rubber facilities studied for this report, LAC and Cocopa, there are local chapters of 
the General Agricultural and Allied Workers‟ Union (GAAWUL), respectively the Liberian 
Agriculture Workers Union (LAWU) and the Cocopa Agriculture Workers Union 
(COAWU). We will discuss the role of these unions and the relationship between them, 
workers and management in more detail below. 
 
Workers at the Firestone Plantation are represented by new leadership of the Firestone 
Agricultural Workers‟ Union of Liberia (FAWUL) that came to power in historic union 
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elections in 2007. The union negotiated landmark collective bargaining agreements in 
2008 and 2010. These are discussed in more detail below.  
 
 
Product 
Conscripted Labor and the Birth of the Rubber Industry in Liberia. Ever since its 
foundation, the central government of Liberia has influenced local communities in rural 
Liberia. This was particularly the case after a resource-extraction economy developed in 
the 20th century. This economy, in which rubber played an important role, was 
predominantly in the hands of international companies and their collaborators in the 
local elite. But it also could not work without large-scale labor mobilization.15 An 
understanding of how this history unfolded in the country is important when evaluating 
modern-day labor conditions.  
 
Hut Tax System. The starting point for the process of large-scale labor mobilization was 
the implementation of the annual hut tax in 1916. This tax was supposed to be paid by 
all adult men and, as such, forced rural people into a monetary economy. In order to 
pay the tax, people began to offer their labor for hire, initially to traders but eventually to 
international companies that had won concessions16 to establish, among other things, 
rubber plantations. The tax was collected by local chiefs who had been informed by 
state agents working with soldiers from the Liberian Frontier Force (LFF) about how 
many huts they had to account taxes for. The chiefs who were responsible for this were 
allowed to keep a commission from the taxes, thereby not only initiating a system of 
“indirect rule,” but also creating a new class of powerful male elders from ruling 
lineages. 
 
Significantly for this research, the hut tax system was developed in tandem with a 
system of forced conscription of labor. Manpower was needed for public works – for 
example, the construction of bridges, roads, barracks and other government houses – 
but also for work with government officials. It was the chiefs who were responsible for 
supplying able-bodied men to work on these so-called “government” projects.  
 
This system increased in importance when the agreement with Firestone was first 
signed in 1926. The establishment and operation of a large rubber plantation required a 
national labor market, but since this market did not yet exist, the Liberian government 
ordered the chiefs to draft laborers for the plantation. Thus, it was the Liberian 
government that initially assumed the main responsibility for the recruitment of the 
workforce for the Firestone plantation.17  
 
This system – established in the 1920s – continued to exist at least until the 1960s. In 
1954, approximately 16,000 workers on the Firestone plantation (equivalent to almost 
80% of the work force) had been forcibly recruited, having been sent there by their local 
chiefs.18 
 
The labor system established to implement and maintain the rubber plantations was 
therefore built on state-imposed coercion. Forcibly recruited workers received the same 
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salary, fringe benefits and working conditions as free workers.19 The key difference was 
that the latter had chosen to come to Firestone (and later LAC, Cocopa and the other 
plantations that were established), while the former did not have this freedom. They had 
been ordered to leave their families and homes.20 
 
International Criticism. This system of forced conscription of labor made possible the 
rapid establishment of rubber plantations in Liberia and was an essential boost to the 
Liberian economy. However, it also quickly garnered international criticism, with the 
League of Nations issuing a report in 1929 that accused Liberia of using an institution 
more-or-less equivalent to slavery. In 1930, a Commission of Enquiry established by the 
League of Nations produced a series of findings and recommendations on plantation 
labor in the country. It found that the system of forced recruitment in Liberia was 
sanctioned by the Vice President through a clear chain of command. This chain of 
command passed from the Vice President‟s order, through the district commissioners to 
the paramount chiefs and then to village chiefs.21 
 
Growth of the Rubber Industry and Emergence of a National Labor Market. There is 
some difference of opinion as to when the system of forced conscription of labor in the 
rubber industry ended. Some argue that it declined in significance following the 
implementation of President Tubman‟s Open Door policy after the end of World War II,22 
while others argue that it was still flourishing well into the 1960s.23 What is undisputed, 
however, is the fact that Firestone‟s economic success, in combination with Tubman‟s 
Open Door policy, led to the emergence of more foreign rubber concessions with 
Americo-Liberian investment that in turn led to the creation of a national labor market: 
The existing system of forced conscription of labor was expensive to manage and 
output was inefficient. Given the number of new rubber plantations being established in 
the country, it was determined that moving to a national labor market would be less 
expensive and more cost efficient. 
 
Since the arrival of Firestone in 1926 rubber plantations have been the single largest 
source of employment in Liberia. Prior to the outbreak of the civil war more than 30 
percent of the total national workforce was employed on rubber plantations, with the 
overall majority of these both illiterate and unskilled.24 However, even if Firestone was 
the pace-setter and lead implementer, what happened later in this sector cannot be 
understood if we do not consider the role that successive Liberian governments and 
elites have played. Initially they welcomed Firestone and created the system of forcibly 
recruited labor that was needed to staff the plantation; later the same governments and 
elites manipulated wage levels. The main reason for this was that Liberian-owned farms 
were less productive than their internationally-owned counterparts. This gave the 
national elite a clear excuse to keep wages as low as possible. Thus, even if a national 
labor market did emerge after the end of the Second World War, this was a labor 
market in which the national salary level in the sector was manipulated to serve the 
interests of the Liberian elite.25  
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A Profile of Major Plantations in the Sector. The production and processing of rubber is 
an agricultural activity. Rubber plantations exist in a rural landscape, but at the same 
time are separate, as they have little in common with ordinary rural life in the country. 
Plantations are almost like small states with their own urban centers.  
 
The boundary of the plantation is well-demarcated (particularly in the case of LAC and 
Firestone. There is an internal infrastructure, several communities, water supply, and 
schools and health centers that were built by plantation owners for the plantation 
population. Most people living and working on the plantations leave the grounds 
periodically, with some leaving daily and others less often. In theory, one could live their 
whole life on a plantation without ever leaving it. 
 
Large-scale rubber plantations operating in Liberia include: 
 Firestone – near Harbel, Margibi County 
 Liberia Agricultural Company (LAC) – near Buchanan, Grand Bassa County 
 Guthrie (also known as Goodrich plantation) near Baha, Bomi County 
 Liberia Company (LIBCO) – near Cocopa, Nimba County 
 Salala Rubber Corporation – near Nienka, Margibi County 
 Cavalla (initially part of the Firestone concession) – near Harper, Maryland 
County 
 Sinoe Rubber Corporation (SRC) – near Greenville, Sinoe County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26
Rubber plantations in Liberia.   
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During the civil war, some of these plantations were abandoned or taken over by rebel 
forces. Poorly managed during that time, many plantations emerged from the civil war 
needing significant investment to restore operations. Firestone and LAC were relatively 
unscathed and have continued to be the two largest producers in the country, producing 
3000-4000 and 2000 tons of rubber per month, respectively, in July 2007. In 
comparison, two smaller plantations - Guthrie and Cavalla –produced 4,000 tons each 
for the entire year of 2006.27  
 
Hundreds of smallholder farms sell raw rubber to these company-owned plantations. In 
fact, many household farmers in Liberia note that rubber is currently their most 
important cash crop.28  
 
The Production Chain of Rubber. The production of rubber revolves around the life 
cycle of the tree from which the rubber (or latex) originates. This means that the 
production process for rubber requires the trees; people who can plant, maintain and 
harvest them; and the equipment needed for this work. As a production process, this is 
extremely labor intensive, and requires a well-qualified workforce. 
 
In general terms, the production of rubber involves three major stages: planting, 
production (or tapping) and processing. In each stage, several specific tasks are 
involved, and each relates to the life-cycle of the tree. The rubber tree is fragile, 
particularly in the period immediately after planting and up to when it reaches maturity at 
seven or eight years of age. The tree can be tapped carefully from the age of two or 
three, but its prime years of production, if well-maintained, are from seven to 25 years.29  
 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
New 1trees                           
Weeding and                          
pruning 
Tapping                          
Processing                          
1 Nursery, clear land, dig holes, plant 
Table 2. Rubber production process in the lifecycle of a tree 
 
The lifecycle of a rubber field is therefore defined by three distinct phases. First, as 
seedlings, the trees are in a nursery, while a field is being prepared for them. When the 
seedlings are ready, these young trees are transplanted to the prepared field. Second, 
for seven to eight years, apart from periodic gentle tapping, the main activity on the field 
is pruning and weeding. Third, after this seven to eight year period, the trees are ready 
for full production. At this stage, they will be tapped all year round. However, the peak 
periods of the season last from the heavy rains of May to September and the lighter 
rains of October to January. Production is considerably lower in the dry period lasting 
from February to April. 
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Tapping rubber trees. The clearing of land, breeding in the nursery, and the weeding 
and pruning of fields and young trees are integral elements to the production process. 
The most labor-intensive stage, however, is the tapping of trees. This involves each tree 
being “tapped” with a cup that is attached to it just below the cut made in the tree‟s bark 
to collect the latex. In a normal working day, tappers will collect “cup-lumps” from the 
previous day – that is, the latex that has poured into the cup overnight – then clean the 
cup and return to collect the new latex later that same day. At the end of the day (or 
alternately after a whole field has been cleared), the tapper will carry both the fresh 
latex and cup-lumps to the nearest field station for weighing. At the field station, acid is 
added to the latex as the first step in producing rubber. At this stage, there are safety 
concerns for workers during the collection and production process, with injuries in the 
field including eye and skin damage from spilling latex; snakebites; back pain and 
muscle cramps from carrying heavy loads to the field stations; and exposure to the acid 
that is added to the latex at the field station. The particular health and safety concerns 
of note on LAC and Cocopa will be discussed below. 
 
From the field stations, rubber is collected and sent on for further processing. On a large 
plantation such as LAC, this work is done on-site at a processing facility that cleans the 
rubber over several stages. This is followed by heat treatment and packing the newly-
produced raw material into blocks ready for export. Smaller plantations like Cocopa or 
individual small-holders will sell their semi-processed rubber to larger plantations 
(Firestone or LAC) for this second phase of production. This means that factory-based 
processing in Liberia only takes place at Firestone and LAC. The majority of the labor 
force in the Liberian rubber sector therefore works in the fields, with the majority of 
these working as tappers. 
 
Rubber Markets. Nearly half of all natural rubber output is used for tire production; and 
about 60 percent ends up in the automotive market as a whole, which includes belts, 
hoses and seals. Natural rubber is also used for gloves, mats, condoms, hot water 
bottles, and protective clothing.30 
 
Approximately 90 percent of rubber production takes place in Asia, with Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, India, China and Vietnam accounting for 88 percent of global 
production. Liberia accounts for approximately 64 percent of quantity and 72 percent of 
value for American rubber imports, with Vietnam and Thailand also being significant 
sources.31  
 
Today natural rubber accounts for just 44 percent of world consumption; synthetic 
rubber accounts for the rest. However, natural rubber's environment-friendly nature, 
biodegradability, and lack of dependence on oil pricing have led to an increase in 
natural versus synthetic rubber in recent years.32  
 
Liberia is an exporter of raw rubber (a relatively low value commodity), and has no 
secondary or tertiary rubber processing activities. While tire manufacturing in Liberia 
has been discussed for decades, rubber is not the primary ingredient in tires. Tire 
composition varies by manufacturer, so production of this kind in the country is 
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unlikely.33 In 2006, total natural rubber exports from Liberia reached 100,000 tons, of 
which two-thirds was block rubber and one-third liquid latex. Firestone was responsible 
for over 60 percent of total rubber exports.34  
 
 
People 
Staff on rubber plantations have a salary income and are normally given a formal letter 
of employment in which they are categorized as either junior or senior. Employee, in 
contrast, is the term used to describe unskilled laborers who have the potential to 
become staff. They do not receive a formal letter of employment, but go through an 
interview and medical examination. Successful candidates fill out relevant paperwork at 
the company‟s Personnel and Legal Affairs Office and are issued an ID card. 
Contractors follow a similar pattern but are “hired” on a contractual basis (at LAC, for 
three months; shorter at Cocopa).  
 
Employees work on the plantation on a permanent contract. Employee tappers have a 
daily wage that is higher than that of contractor tappers. These employees work in small 
teams under a headman. In such teams there may also be contractors. Contractors 
work mainly on a daily salary, but some are also employed over a longer period of time, 
such as a week or a month. Thus, contractors fulfill the need for an additional pool of 
labor when it is needed. Their engagement is often seasonal: In periods when there are 
lots of tasks to be fulfilled, contractors will receive work. However, in periods when tasks 
can be covered by employees, contractors will be unemployed. 
 
To add to this complexity, not all contractors are hired under the same conditions. Some 
contractors are hired directly by staff. These are called management contractors, and 
receive salaries directly from the plantation. Another category of contractors is sub-
contractors, or individuals hired by other contractors that do not work formally for the 
plantation. Rather, they work for the contractor, even though their day-to-day worksite is 
the plantation. To provide an example, under these circumstances, a management 
contractor may take on a specific task, for example tapping a certain field or number of 
trees or clearing an area for replanting. He or she would agree with management on a 
certain fee for the task. The management contractor would then hire a group of workers 
(sub-contractors) to conduct this work. Those contracted in this way work for the 
management contractor and not for the plantation. This means that the management 
contractor is an independent “entrepreneur” who provides certain services to the 
plantation when needed. 
 
Research indicated that management contractors tend to be wealthier or better-
connected. Sub-contractors come from neighboring rural communities and are primarily 
young men needing or wanting cash income for a specific period of time. These sub-
contractors are generally paid the least for their work, with wages lower than the daily 
rate set by management for contract workers. 
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Policies 
Government Policies. Liberia has laws that regulate the rubber sector, including a 
minimum working age, statutory minimum wages, occupational safety and health 
standards, and laws against child labor and child trafficking. However, there are 
important gaps and exemptions for rubber workers in the legislative framework, 
including the right of plantation managers to summary dismissal and the absence of a 
maximum limit on hours of work.35  
 
The Liberian government has ratified a number of UN human rights treaties that set out 
the framework for engagement between the government and the Liberian private sector. 
These include the: 
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; 
 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination; 
 Convention on the Rights of the Child; 
 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; 
 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment and its Optional Protocol; and 
 ILO Convention No. 182 concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for 
the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor. 
 
The following table shows Liberia's ratification of ILO labor standards and other 
international labor and human rights protocols. 
 
Table 3: Liberia Labor Laws
36
 
 
  
Rubber Production in Liberia: An Exploratory Assessment of Living and Working Conditions, with Special 
Attention to Forced Labor 15 
Liberian labor laws are poorly enforced, due in large part to insufficient resources: In 
2009, an ILO study found that Liberia had less than 50 labor inspectors to promote 
compliance with the country‟s labor laws.37  
 
A submission to the United Nations Human Rights Council in April 2010 by the UK-
based Institute for Human Rights and Business asserted that while Liberia‟s gradual 
legal reform follows a decade of civil war, the country‟s private sector continues to suffer 
from a number of shortfalls that affect Liberia‟s human rights obligations under 
international law. With regard to the rubber sector, the submission highlighted the 
following three points: 
 Inadequate monitoring of safety standards, including protection of workers 
from hazardous materials; 
 Use of child labor; and  
 Reliance on an informal and casually-employed workforce, resulting in less 
favorable working and living conditions compared to those formally employed 
by plantation companies.38 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility in Liberia. Large multinational corporations are 
increasingly rolling out corporate responsibility (CSR) programs in Liberia.  
 
Firestone, the country's largest employer with over 6,100 employees,39 reports having 
invested USD 107 million in CSR initiatives in the country since 2006. Firestone 
provides employees with free housing, medical care and education for workers‟ 
children. It has built 2,500 homes, operates 26 schools that teach 16,000 children, and 
runs nine health care facilities that treat employees and their families as well as 
members of the community. The company has also distributed more than 2.21 million 
free rubber tree saplings to Liberian farmers.40 The company describes these 
expenditures in some circumstances as CSR, while others would describe them as part 
of their legal, concession, union contract, or other regulatory obligations.  
 
Other multinationals active in Liberia also have CSR programs. ArcelorMittal, as part of 
its mining development agreement with the Liberian government, contributes annually to 
a County Social Development Fund that is managed and disbursed by the communities 
affected by its operations. Projects include the rehabilitation of roads, schools, and 
hospitals.41 ArcelorMittal is also collaborating with the German Technical Cooperation 
(GTZ) to establish a CSR forum in Liberia.42  
 
Government companies also conduct CSR activities. The Liberia Petroleum Refining 
Company, a public entity, has a CSR program providing grants to organizations in 
education, health, agriculture, and community development.43  
 
In the past three years, four major companies have promised a total of USD 2.6 billion 
in palm oil investment, with the largest pledge from Golden VerOleum, which 
announced an investment of USD 1.6 billion in 2010. The Malaysia-based palm oil 
company Sime Darby pledged USD 800 million for a 63-year concession. All of the palm 
oil companies are members of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), an 
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international certification program headquartered in Malaysia that unites producers, 
processors, manufacturers, retailers, banks and NGOs to develop and implement global 
standards for sustainable palm oil.44  
 
The Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (LEITI) began in 2005. Liberia 
was the first country to extend the scope of the Extractives Industry Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) beyond mining to include forestry operations. Each year, the LEITI 
publishes payments and receipts from the oil and gas, mining, forestry and agriculture 
industries to promote transparency and reduce the risk of misappropriation of funds. 
The 3rd LEITI Reconciliation, published in May 2011, shows a total of USD 55.8 million 
in tax receipts from 121 companies, with nearly half of this amount provided by the 
mining industry.45  
 
 
Programs 
In 2010, USAID developed the "Rubber Industry Master Plan 2010 - 2040: A National 
Agenda for Rubber Sector Development" in collaboration with the Liberian Ministry of 
Agriculture. The master plan sets up the Rubber Development Fund Incorporated 
(RDFI), a joint public-private organization that will implement all master plan strategies. 
The program will rehabilitate, replant and expand Liberian smallholdings with new 
rubber clones. The plan calls for plant certification and the introduction of best practices. 
The plan's goal for Liberia is to convert at least 10 percent of its raw rubber and 30 
percent of its rubber wood to value added products over the next 15 years.46 
Since 2006, the donor community has provided significant humanitarian assistance to 
rebuild Liberian society. Traditional bilateral donors such as the United States, the 
European Commission and Germany disbursed, respectively, USD 103 million, USD 88 
million and USD 45 million in 2010; for capacity and infrastructure development and 
technical assistance.47  
 
Since the end of Liberia's civil war in 2003, the United States has contributed over USD 
1 billion in bilateral assistance and more than USD 1 billion in assessed contributions to 
UNMIL. The US Agency for International Development's (USAID) rebuilding strategy 
focuses on reintegration and rehabilitation. Efforts include national and community 
infrastructure projects, training and education, promoting business development, health 
care, and anti-corruption.48 
 
A table in Appendix shows donor assistance by year for all major donors from 2004-
2007. 
 
 
Working Conditions in the Rubber Supply Chain in Liberia 
For years, controversy has plagued the rubber sector, with the majority of the attention 
on the Firestone plantation. In 2005, the International Labor Rights Fund filed a case 
against Bridgestone in the US District Court of California alleging “forced labor, the 
modern equivalent of slavery” on the Firestone plantation in Harbel, Liberia.49  
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In 2005, the Save My Future Foundation (SAMFU) published a report asserting that 
workers at the Firestone plantation regularly worked 12 hours a day, with very low 
wages and frequent demands to double output with no increase in pay (“double tapping 
days”). Workers were expected to tap 750-800 trees each, and had to carry two latex 
buckets weighing 70 pounds each to assigned storage tanks roughly 1.6 kilometers 
away. The quotas were too high for many workers to meet by themselves, and so 
workers were bringing their children along, or hiring subcontractors, in order to meet the 
quota and earn their daily minimum wage. Schools were reportedly of poor quality, and 
did not extend into high school. Living conditions were squalid, with poor sanitation and 
no electricity. SAMFU issued a follow-up report in 2008 in which the organization 
asserted that Firestone had made some changes, but that problems persisted, including 
inadequate schools and housing and sanitation, high quotas and very low wages, long 
hours, health and safety violations, and the continued reliance on manual transportation 
for tapped latex.  
 
In 2006, the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) released the results of a study by its Human 
Rights and Protection Section (HRPS) of the human rights situation on five of the seven 
major rubber plantations in Liberia.50 Entitled "Human Rights in Liberia's Rubber 
Plantations: Tapping into the Future”, the findings of this study included that workers 
were subject to hazardous working conditions without proper training or safety 
equipment; child labor was common – due to increasing workloads/quotas placed on 
tappers in light of diminishing productivity of rubber trees, inadequate or inaccessible 
educational facilities, and the fact that children of subcontractors cannot go to plantation 
schools; and that “many workers are not represented by trade unions, they do not 
receive fair wages or equal remuneration, and do not have the right to strike”. Extremely 
poor living conditions and sanitation, and inadequate or restricted-access medical 
facilities, were also noted with concern.  
 
In 2009, the ILRF published "Firestone and Violations of Core Labor Rights in Liberia," 
alleging that Firestone had violated all of the ILO‟s fundamental labor rights on its 
rubber plantation in the country.51  
 
In 2008 and 2010, landmark collective agreements were signed between the new 
leadership of the Firestone Agricultural Workers‟ Union (FAWUL) and Firestone Rubber 
Plantation. The 2008 collective bargaining agreement reduced quotas by 25 percent 
and banned child labor on the plantation.52 In the 2010 agreement, FAWUL negotiated a 
commitment with Firestone to “change the current mode of transportation” that 
consisted of rubber tappers carrying two metal buckets, weighing up to 150 pounds, 
suspended from a stick across their shoulders. Beginning in 2010, a new system was 
instituted in which rubber is collected in plastic buckets which are picked up by a tractor 
trailer and hauled to weigh stations.53 In the agreement, FAWUL also negotiated with 
Firestone to provide children living on the plantation with better schools.54 
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Methodology & Limitations 
 
Background 
The research for this report was carried out in 2010 and 2011. Verité contracted with 
Norway-based Fafo, an independent and multidisciplinary research foundation focusing 
on social welfare and trade policy, labor and living conditions, public health, migration 
and integration and transnational security and development issues. The lead Fafo 
researchers for this study have extensive labor rights and related research and 
development experience in Liberia and elsewhere in Central and West Africa.  
 
Fafo implemented the research collaboratively with the University of Liberia, 
represented by the Institute for Population Studies, with assistance from the Liberian 
Institute for Statistics and Geo-Services (LISGIS). This partnership enabled the 
research to benefit from the insights and experiences of a range of experts with local, 
national, and international experience and perspective on rubber, Liberia, and labor 
research more generally. This was particularly important in light of the security, political, 
and other sensitivities in Liberia.  
 
Fafo designed and developed the research methodology, and implemented the field 
research. Verification and analysis of field results, and the writing up of the findings, 
were similarly performed by Fafo. Verité reviewed and edited the final research report in 
accordance with Verité‟s framework for evaluating indicators and vulnerabilities to labor 
exploitation.  
 
The research was an exploratory study based on participatory qualitative methods, 
including individual semi-structured interviews, life-history approaches, and focus group 
discussions with stakeholders that included workers, their household members, 
management and owners. These methods are discussed in further detail below. The 
critical importance of the rubber sector to the Liberian economy, and the still-nascent 
effort to restore the sector to a healthy and productive state following Liberia‟s 14-year 
civil war, meant that any research into social conditions on rubber plantations would be 
highly sensitive. Preliminary research and expert consultations suggested that, to be 
successful, the study should be small in scale, in order to leave a light footprint and not 
raise undue concern or resistance to the research; and should employ semi-structured 
interview techniques using open-ended questions and a flexible set of research 
objectives.  
 
The ILO‟s core labor conventions and Liberian labor law served as the framework for 
the study. Verité‟s analytical methodology examined data from the standpoint of discrete 
indicators of labor conditions, and additionally from the perspective of how the “five P‟s” 
– product, people, place, policies, and programs – contribute to or ameliorate situations 
of labor abuse.  
 
This research did not focus on the Firestone plantation, in order to identify other, less-
explored cases that might bring to light circumstances in the sector that were created or 
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exacerbated by the Liberia‟s 14-year civil war, and to provide more information on 
conditions in parts of the country that have less media and research attention. 
 
The two plantations originally selected for research were Guthrie and Sinoe, both of 
which experienced significant rebel activity during and after the end of the civil war. 
However, following an initial trip by researchers to Liberia in March 2010, it became 
clear that these plantations were undergoing significant restructuring that would make it 
impossible to conduct the kind of research envisioned by the project.55 After thorough 
discussions with research partners, it was decided to refocus the project on the Liberian 
Agricultural Company (LAC) plantation 20 miles north of Buchanan in Grand Bassa 
County and the Cocopa Rubber Company plantation in Nimba County. Cocopa is 
located about five hour‟s drive from Monrovia, fifteen miles from the Guinean border and 
thirty miles from the Ivorian border.  
 
Selection of these two plantations provided the opportunity to research conditions on 
one of the two biggest producers of rubber in the country – LAC – as well as one of the 
smaller company-owned producers (Cocopa). LAC has a labor force of about 3000 
workers (regular and seasonal) and a total population of 25,000, making it second only 
in population and size of workforce to the Firestone plantation. Cocopa is an example of 
a smaller, but still company-operated plantation. It has a population of 6000, with 
roughly 1200 workers in total.  
 
Selection of these two plantations also offered examples of different patterns of 
ownership: The LAC plantation has been in almost constant operation since it was 
established in 1957 by the Italian company Uniroyal. This plantation is currently under 
the management of the Belgian company SOCFIN. In contrast, the Cocopa plantation 
was taken over by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) as late as January 
2007, with management handed over to LIBCO, a Liberian company, three months 
later. After years of neglect and mismanagement during the war and immediate post-
war period, LIBCO is currently replanting trees, hiring new rubber tappers and initiating 
parallel cooperative projects with local farmers. The main objectives of these initiatives 
are to increase output and minimize theft of rubber in support of both workers and local 
farmers. 
 
Finally, these two plantations offered a geographically diverse sample, with one 
plantation located near the capital, Monrovia; and the other in a rural and distant 
location, close to Liberia‟s borders with Cote d‟Ivoire and Guinea.  
 
Prior to conducting the fieldwork that went into this report, it was necessary to obtain 
permission from the Liberian Ministry of Labor. This is a requirement specified by law, 
although primarily a formality. The research team also informed local stakeholders 
about the study and when it would be implemented. Management and union leaders at 
both plantations were contacted before research visits. Research began with a 
management meeting prior to site visits around the plantation. 
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Research Timing 
The preparatory research phase, which included literature review and expert 
consultation, development of draft research design and instruments, and identification of 
research sites, was conducted from late 2009 to early 2010. An initial scoping visit to 
the field, followed by two rounds of field research, were implemented from March 
through November 2010. Data analysis and report writing were then completed by 
December 2011.  
 
Workers were interviewed about their employment over the previous year. 
 
 
Research Methodology and Field Work 
The field research undertaken for this report builds on extensive existing knowledge of 
Liberia, the country‟s history and the role of rubber in that history. A literature review 
was conducted that supported the fieldwork and strengthened the final report following 
data collection and analysis. As noted above, the principal authors of the report have 
worked extensively on Liberia over the last decade and conducted numerous in-country 
research projects in recent years. 
 
This report is based on participatory qualitative methods. These take the form of 
individual semi-structured interviews,56 life-history approaches, and focus group 
discussions with stakeholders that included workers, their household members, 
management and owners. Semi-structured interviews sought to understand the socio-
cultural environment in which workers live on the plantation, exploring their individual 
stories, peoples‟ livelihoods and the impact of labor and working conditions on workers 
and their families. Appendix 2 offers the set of guiding research questions that informed 
these qualitative, exploratory research methods.  
 
The majority of Liberians are not fluent in English as it is spoken internationally. They 
speak local languages (of which there are at least sixteen in the country) and most 
speak some Liberian English. For this report, interviews were conducted in Liberian 
English, or field assistants served as translators when respondents spoke only local 
languages. 
 
Results were verified by sharing findings within the research team and cross-analyzing 
input from different workers and from different sources (e.g., interviews versus focus 
groups or observation) to check for coherence and consistency of findings.  
 
 
Semi-Structured Interviews 
The informants that were interviewed were not randomly selected. Rather, they were 
chosen on the basis of who and what they represented, with the aim of achieving 
diversity in representation. The research team sought informants that were male and 
female, young and old, and representatives of different social, economic and political 
groups within worker communities. Initial communications and interviews with workers 
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increased the team‟s understanding of the composition of the community and functioned 
to guide the process of selecting informants. 
 
The aim of semi-structured interviews was to gain a deeper understanding of the living 
and working conditions on the plantation and the factors influencing those conditions. 
To conduct the interviews in a systematic manner, researchers were trained on 
interview methodologies by the lead researcher. 
 
Semi-structured interviews were flexible so that interviewers could explore topics that 
were brought up during open-ended questioning. Interviewers were instructed to 
encourage interviewees to tell their own story about living and working conditions with 
as few interruptions as possible. In order to help interviewee advance their stories, 
interviewers were instructed to use simple follow-up questions such as:57 
 Why?  
 What happened?  
 What did you do about it? 
 What did you think about it?  
 Did anyone help you? 
 Why did you/did you not turn to that particular person or institution for 
assistance? 
 Could you have done anything differently?  
 What would have made it easier for you? 
 How did this affect you or your family and community? 
 How do you think this could have been different? 
 
 
In-Depth Interviews 
In-depth interviews were also utilized to explore workers‟ own perspectives of the social 
and economic conditions on plantations and the impact these have on their livelihood 
opportunities. An ethnographic life-history approach was used to conduct these 
interviews.58 Guided by a semi-structured questionnaire, the point of departure was the 
informant‟s location at the time of discussion, e.g., the physical location or the site of the 
interview. From there, the interviewer and informant traced backwards through the 
informant‟s life and experience. The aim of the in-depth interview was to establish the 
chain of events leading the informant(s) to the particular place where the session was 
occurring.59 
 
 
Focus-Group Discussions 
We approached the focus group discussions by organizing informants into small groups 
to discuss topics presented to them by a facilitator. The purpose of the focus groups 
was to obtain a more nuanced view of the topic at hand, gaining a full appreciation of its 
various dimensions. We used this method in order to obtain additional comments and 
insights from informants on information that might not have been articulated or obtained 
using other methods. We also expected the focus groups to serve as another way to 
confirm information received from other approaches. We found these groups valuable 
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as a way to obtain information about people‟s values or the reasoning they use 
pertaining to certain issues. At another level, the focus group can be an effective way of 
minimizing “individualistic bias.” While interviewing individuals reveals a person‟s 
particular views and character, a focus group identifies social and cultural perspectives 
that are articulated through the interaction and discussion of a larger group. 
 
We chose to design our focus group discussions using relatively small numbers, 
between five and 12 people. This was based on the goal of finding the optimal size that 
would ensure continuous discussion and a generation of ideas, but without everyone 
talking at once. Our focus group sessions lasted for one or two hours, but we avoided 
using firm time limits and sought to be sensitive to the level of interest and availability of 
participants. Throughout this research project, we utilized both carefully planned focus 
groups, as well as others organized in a more open-ended way. 
 
 
Informant Profiles 
For this report, researchers conducted 98 formal interviews and 20 focus group 
sessions.60 Twelve of the focus group sessions were conducted at LAC and eight at 
Cocopa. These sessions had no fewer than five and no more than 12 participants, with 
eight having only male members, two only female and the remaining 10 having a mix of 
both. Three managers and one union representative were interviewed at LAC, while two 
managers and one union representative were interviewed at Cocopa. Many more 
individuals participated in smaller, informal conversations that occurred throughout 
plantation visits. Table 4 below provides a breakdown of the persons interviewed. 
 
 
61
Table 4. Persons interviewed  
Profile LAC Cocopa Total 
Male 36 22 58 
Female 32 8 40 
Age 18-35 43 23 66 
Age 36-60 16 6 22 
Age 60+ 9 1 10 
Number of years at the plantation 1-10 37 23 60 
Number of years at the plantation 20+ 31 7 38 
Employees (tappers) 59 28 87 
Sub-contractors (tappers) 9 2 11 
Total 68 30 98 
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Limitations 
 
In addition to field research, this report draws extensively on literature about Liberia in 
general and rubber in Liberia in particular. What is presented here is an effort to 
construct a clear narrative using diverse methods that blend field observation, semi-
structured interviews, focus group discussions and a literature review. 
 
It should be noted, however, that this study was limited in both time and scope due to 
the resources available.  
 
The sample universe for this study was drawn from two of Liberia‟s seven large-scale 
rubber plantations. As discussed above, the Firestone plantation was not included in the 
study. While the two plantations selected for this research have many characteristics 
representative of large rubber plantations in Liberia, this study was not designed to be 
nationally representative, and no claims are made in this regard.  
 
A key limitation of the study was the absence of smallholder farms in the sample. A 
variety of factors made the study of smallholder farms infeasible for the research, 
including (among others) time and resource constraints, challenges to access and the 
establishment of a proper sample universe, and the logistical difficulty of travel amongst 
these farms.  
 
Non-random sampling methods were used in the selection of both interviewees and 
research sites, and sample sizes were basically arbitrary. That said, clear patterns did 
emerge from the data collected.  
 
Finally, it is important to note again that Liberia has a long history of mismanagement, 
authoritarian rule, and corruption that has been followed more recently by a devastating 
14 year civil war. The vast majority of Liberians are poor and live under challenging 
economic and social circumstances. Living and working conditions on rubber 
plantations should be seen through this contemporary and historical lens. 
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Research Findings 
 
Introduction 
 
With a respective population of 25,000 and 6,000, LAC and Cocopa are major 
population centers in Liberia.62 According to managers at LAC and Cocopa, new 
workers arrive at the plantations every month seeking employment. 
 
Research indicated that the majority of 
workers at both LAC and Cocopa live 
within the grounds of the plantation. 
Workers are categorized as staff, 
employees and contractors, in addition to 
 
 
Structure of Employment on a Rubber 
Plantation 
the management team.  
 
Staff perform administrative tasks. Most 
staff members have been recruited 
externally for their current position (e.g., 
from Monrovia or from Firestone), based on 
their skills and qualifications. Informants 
reported that, in some cases, employees
had begun working on the plantation as 
contractors or employees, and worked up to 
the position of staff.63 
 
 
Labor Relations and Unions 
As mentioned earlier, on both plantations studied, there were active local chapters of 
GAAWUL. The relationship between the union and the presence or absence of forced 
labor conditions on the plantations was not a focus of the Verité study. A brief summary 
of the nature of relations between the union and the workers is offered here, as 
background and contextual information. No observations on the effectiveness of union 
protection are offered, as this was not a research objective.  
 
Research indicated that all regular employees are members of their respective local 
chapters, even if union membership is not officially compulsory. Both the respective 
union leaders and management presented their relations to researchers as good and 
cordial, but there were indications of underlying issues of tension and dissent between 
management and union leaders, and – in the case of LAC – between the union rank 
and file and their local leaders. On the latter, informants talked of current disagreement 
on a number of issues, including housing, education and medical services. 
 
Cocopa Union. At Cocopa, tensions between management and the union were  
described as mainly connected to disappointment and unmet expectations in the current 
leadership. The current manager of the plantation, and owner of the LIBCO Company, 
belongs to the Tripp family that originally established Cocopa. Naturally hopes were 
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high when a Tripp, whose great grand uncle was the original Tripp that once established 
the plantation, returned from the United States to reclaim his ancestor‟s plantation.64 
The current management team arrived in June 2010, after Supreme Court decisions in 
2007 gave the Cocopa concession back to the original owners, after the plantation had 
been in the hands of government ministers during the Taylor years and ex-combatants 
after the end of the civil war in August 2003. 
 
According to a union representative, there is open dialogue with management: “We talk 
every day, but there is too much talk and too little is happening, making the union look 
bad in front of the members.” Management reported to researchers that they took over a 
decaying plantation and progress has thus been slow.  
 
According to a management representative, Cocopa suffered from mismanagement and 
financial corruption. Management acknowledged the need to build new schools and 
clinics as well as rehabilitate workers‟ dwellings, but stated that there was only so much 
that could be done before the plantation started to yield a real and sustained profit over 
time. At the time of the interviews, current management had not been in the position for 
very long .  
 
Other respondents observed that new management had fed early expectations by 
setting unrealistic timelines for promised improvements without making clear the 
challenges of rehabilitating core operations in order to earn revenue to pay for social 
investments. The result has been a sentiment voiced by many that the new 
management is hiding things, covering up, and unwilling to stand by its social 
commitments and their respective financial costs. This has given rise to some tension, 
but not yet any open confrontations between workers and management. 
 
The Collective Bargaining Agreement at LAC. Tensions were higher at the LAC 
plantation, stemming from a new three-year Collective Bargaining Agreement that came 
into effect on July 1, 2010 between the Liberian Agriculture Workers Union (LAWU) and 
LAC. A focus group was organized to explore this issue in more depth. The findings 
from that focus group are presented here.  
 
The collective agreement had stipulated that the “premium (e.g., the top pay that goes 
into effect if workers exceed their daily quota) would be based on a three year plan 
according to the reproductive life of the rubber tree.” Local workers were very 
disappointed with their first “take-home-pay” under the new CBA when they received 
their July salary on 9 August 2010. Focus group discussants reported feeling that LAC 
management, and also their union leaders, had “stolen” from them on the basis of what 
they felt was an “unfair distribution of the premium.” The result was a wildcat strike that 
lasted from the 10th to 17th of August 2010. The strike became chaotic. Some structures 
and plantation equipment were burned and most of the management team fled the 
plantation after they had called for the assistance of the nearest UNMIL (United Nations 
Mission in Liberia) troops stationed in the area.65 Focus group participants made it clear 
that they had never intended to harm anybody physically.  
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After seven days of unrest, the workers agreed to return to work after the LAC, the 
LAWU and the Ministry of Labor promised to look into their grievances. As far as 
researchers were able to establish from interviews, both with tappers and their union 
representatives, no force or threats of force or dismissal were used to stop the strike. In 
the end, a settlement was negotiated in which parties agreed to push the issues into 
future talks based on collective investigations by LAC, LAWU and the Ministry of Labor.  
 
Following the above description of the workforce and union-worker-management 
relations at LAC and Cocopa, research findings on working conditions at the two 
plantations are presented below.  
 
 
Findings 
 
As discussed in Methodology & Limitations, this study was small-scale, exploratory and 
impressionistic. Research probed for indicators of exploitative working conditions at 
LAC and Cocopa, including indicators of forced labor. By virtue of the semi-structured, 
open-ended interview techniques employed, research also captured other issues of 
working and living conditions of concern to informants themselves.  
 
Research detected several potential indicators of forced labor at LAC and Cocopa – 
including forced overtime, financial penalties, and debt connected to an obligation to 
work. Although the presence of these indicators signals an increased risk for forced 
labor, each case must be assessed individually to determine the interplay of indicators 
and the context to determine whether or not it rises to the level of forced labor.  
 
These and other working and living conditions explored by the study are described 
below. 
 
 
Quotas, Cash Benefits and Financial Penalties 
Tappers are paid on the basis of what they produce, but there are also quotas that they 
must reach. If they do not reach them, not only 
are they paid less, but they may also be 
subject to financial penalties.  
 
At Cocopa, the quota is now based on the 
number of trees tapped per day. Each tapper is 
supposed to tap 300 trees per day, and most 
interviewed workers reported being satisfied 
with this quota. The union at Cocopa likewise 
reported being satisfied with the current quota. 
Prior to August 2010, the quota was 500 trees 
per day.  
 
 
Payment according to productivity 
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There is a “minimum wage” of USD 3.25 per day,66 but at Cocopa the term is somewhat 
misleading: The minimum wage only comes into play when a tapper is on leave; for 
example, following a work-related accident or during a maternity leave entitlement of 
three months. Leave of absence due to ordinary forms of illness that are not work-
related is covered by 60 percent of the minimum wage, plus half a bag of rice. For those 
that work, there is no minimum wage; it depends entirely on what workers produce. 
Workers are paid 125 x USD 0.085 per pound of latex collected (based on the 
agreement negotiated between management and the union), which, according to the 
union, gives an average monthly income of USD 125. This payment scheme was 
introduced by the union. Researchers did not detect that penalties were levied by 
management against contractors or sub-contractors that did not meet their quotas. 
 
At LAC, each tapper is required to tap between 400 and 500 trees per day, depending 
on the terrain and other conditions; but here there is a minimum wage for all those 
employed by the plantation. The daily minimum wage is USD 3.60 (from July 2011, 
USD 6.40). According to interviews, if the tapper exceeds his or her daily quota of trees, 
a positive premium comes into effect. Alternatively, if a tapper is unable to fulfill his or 
her quota, a negative premium may come into effect. An example of this would be if 
there were no “good” reasons for not fulfilling the quota. Although other factors come 
into play, the negative premium is calculated at a daily rate of: USD 3.60/total number of 
trees x untapped trees of quota = negative premium. Older workers reported to 
researchers that the quotas were set too high to achieve in the time allotted. At LAC, 
there is also a daily rate for the contract workers of USD 2.50 per day.67 It remains 
unclear from the research how the new Liberian Labor Law will affect contract workers, 
as they are non-unionized and therefore not part of any collective bargaining framework. 
 
Research indicated that the premium at LAC is quite important as it makes it easier to 
pay back loans taken up in the past (see Debt below). This was mainly an issue at LAC; 
as the Cocopa plantation, at the time of research, was not giving loans to staff and 
employees. 
 
Management and workers reported frequent disagreement over what constitutes a fair 
quota, and on what basis it should estimated. There are several methods for this 
estimation, and changes have recently been implemented at both LAC and Cocopa. 
Table 5 below provides a breakdown of employee views concerning the fairness of 
quota levels at LAC and Cocopa. 
Table 5. Views about quotas among those interviewed at LAC & Cocopa 
 Too high About right No answer Total 
LAC 23 40 5 68 
18-35 years of age 3 36 4 43 
36-60 years of age 11 4 1 16 
60+ years of age 9 0 0 9 
Cocopa 5 21 4 30 
18-35 years of age 1 20 2 23 
36-60 years of age 3 1 2 6 
60+ years of age 1 0 0 1 
Total 28 61 9 98 
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Research indicated that the quota system at LAC is transparent in-so-far as it is well 
understood by the tapper. However, the system is also quite complex given that it may 
change from one field of trees to another, depending on whether the terrain is hilly or 
flat and the age of the trees. Younger trees are shorter and more easily accessible, but 
one also needs to be much more careful when tapping them. Workers on younger trees 
must work harder to achieve their premium, as these trees yield less. This means that 
quotas and the opportunity to tap beyond the daily target to achieve the premium can 
change from one day to another, depending on the type of trees being tapped. Some 
workers, in informal conversations, reported that certain headmen and their teams were 
favored by junior management by being assigned flat fields with high-producing trees 
more often than other teams. However, research did not detect evidence of systematic 
bias in favor of particular groups of workers, or that senior management was involved in 
such bias.  
 
In sum, research found that there is frequent disagreement over setting the quotas, and 
that some favoritism may be involved in tree assignments that, in turn, affect the ability 
to meet the quota. That said, the majority of workers interviewed reported to field 
researchers that the existing quota on their plantation was “about right”. Verité 
recommends that the relationship between quotas and hours of work, and the use of 
quotas as an incentive or coercive mechanism, be the subject of further investigative 
study. This topic would benefit from in-depth research that examines the ways in which 
quotas are applied similarly or differently at various plantations, and among different 
categories of workers; how factors such as tree assignments, weighing and payment 
mechanisms and the overall level of the quota affect take-home pay and hours of work.  
 
 
Working Hours and Forced Overtime 
According to interviews, all workers are supposed to work eight hours per day, but 12 
hour shifts are not uncommon. Almost half of the 98 respondents reported working 
longer than eight hours per day. Extended hours beyond the number allowed by law can 
be linked to the daily quotas established by the plantation: If a tapper does not fulfill the 
daily quota, s/he is paid less and may be subject to financial penalties. On the other 
hand, once the quota is fulfilled the worker is free to leave earlier.68 
 
Income depends importantly on hours worked, since, all else being equal, workers will 
earn more money if they work more hours. Some workers reported the desire to make 
as much money as possible as a driving force. At Cocopa, the union leader mentioned a 
tapper that had earned USD 407 one month. This is exceptional, with the average 
monthly income at Cocopa estimated at around USD 125, according to the same union 
leader.  
 
 
Debt  
At LAC, research found that loans were made available by plantation management to all 
employees who participate in the voluntary savings scheme.69 According to 
respondents, the maximum cash credit that one can receive is USD 200. This carries 10 
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percent interest for any amount borrowed and is provided against future wages. In 
theory, loans are supposed to be paid back within six months, but this is reportedly not 
always the case, as sometimes expenses are higher than earned income. 
 
The loans that the plantation offers were reportedly used for a wide range of purposes, 
including investments in business opportunities or to finance marriages or funerals. 
People may also take out loans in order to provide for themselves during longer 
absences from work (for example, due to illness), or simply in order to buy things that 
they otherwise could not afford.  
 
An issue discussed at length with informants was whether indebtedness would bind a 
person to the plantation. All interviewees said that this was not the case. Most knew 
somebody who had run away even if indebted, and this had not had any major 
implications for those persons (apart from the fact that they could not return to the 
plantation anymore, but would have to search for employment and livelihood 
opportunities elsewhere). 
 
The stores operated by the plantation that sell commodities onsite also give credit, but 
these stores do not deduct directly from the monthly paycheck. According to 
respondents, these stores price their commodities at fair market value. 
 
Debt among workers on the plantations is an issue of concern; but research did not 
detect that this pattern of borrowing leads to clear or systematic cases of bonded labor 
at either LAC or Cocopa. Research indicated that workers remain on the plantation not 
because of circumstances related to debt or debt bondage, but because the plantation 
is their only viable provider of waged employment. 
 
 
Salary and Remuneration 
Employees at LAC are paid on the basis of a daily minimum salary and according to 
their productivity. Management contractors also receive a daily salary; however, this is 
lower than that paid to employees. Management contractors are also paid according to 
their productivity. For sub-contractors, payment is dependent on the arrangement they 
have made with the person who has contracted them. At Cocopa, employees are paid 
on the basis of productivity alone. 
 
The variation in employment status not only relates to payment schedule; it also relates 
to the access workers have to goods and services such as school, health, housing, and 
subsidized food. This is shown in Table 6 below. 
 
Rubber Production in Liberia: An Exploratory Assessment of Living and Working Conditions, with Special 
Attention to Forced Labor 30 
LAC 
Employment Fixed Production Subsidised Free health Free Access to 
Housing 
categories wage dependent wage rice, must buy care school credit 
Staff Yes No 2 bags/mth. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Employees Yes Yes 1 bag/mth. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Contractors No Yes No No No No No 
Cocopa 
Employment Fixed Production Subsidised rice, Free health Free Access to 
1 2 3 Housing 
categories wage dependent wage must buy  care  school credit  
Staff Yes No One bag 14 USD Yes Yes - Yes 
Employees No Yes One bag 14 USD Yes Yes - Yes 
Contractors No Yes One bag 14 USD No Yes - No 
1
 Everybody must buy one bag of rice, in addition people can buy an additional bag for 30 USD if they want.  
2 
For worker and up to five dependents less than 18 years of age. Other must pay. 
3
 No information available 
Table 6: Employment categories & benefits at LAC & Cocopa 
 
LAC and Cocopa provide certain benefits for staff and employees. They do not provide 
benefits to contractors. Contractors receive a daily wage, but must obtain everything 
they use on the job themselves. There are no health and educational benefits for 
contractors, although in theory they receive free medical treatment in the case of 
accidents on the job. Contractors also receive less pay for the same type of work as 
employees. At LAC, for example, an employee tapper before the introduction of the new 
Labor Law received a daily wage of USD 3.66, whereas a contract tapper earned only 
USD 2.55. The sub-contracted tapper, on the other hand, does not earn a fixed daily 
wage at all, but is paid on the basis of the amount of rubber tapped, a figure negotiated 
between the contractor and management. Workers in the latter two categories are not 
unionized, and any employee that is promoted to staff is removed from the union. A 
contractor who becomes an employee automatically becomes a union member. 
 
 
Wage Deductions 
Research indicated that there can be significant differences in how much money each 
tapper makes every month due to wage deductions. Deductions are typically made for 
things like a compulsory bag of rice, school fees, and a voluntary savings program. The 
nature of these deductions is discussed below, following some examples of workers‟ 
paychecks.  
 
As the first example, we cite the paycheck of employee tapper Mary J., who works at 
LAC. Mary is a regular employee whose daily rate was USD 3.66 when this interview 
was conducted in December 2010. As Mary had worked for 24 days in November and 
fulfilled her quota, but not exceeded it, her gross income was USD 87.84. However, her 
total earnings were much lower because several deductions were made from her 
income.70 These were: 
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Union Fee (monthly) USD 2  
Rice Bag USD 11  
Half-Bag Rice (extra) USD 13.25  
General Insurance USD 1.75 (voluntary) 
71
Savings  USD 10 (voluntary 
employee contribution) 
Income Tax USD 0.48  
School Fee USD 2 (Deducted for a 
child at school above the 
number for free) 
School Uniform USD 8.58  
Net Income USD 38.78 
 
Another example concerns the remuneration for the same month for a man named 
Kinen K., who is a management contractor at LAC who works only for himself and does 
not hire sub-contractors. Kinen is paid an annual rate of USD 2.50 per day if he fulfills 
his quota. This particular month, however, he has made more money than Mary despite 
her status as a regular employee because he also worked two Sundays and exceeded 
his target. Kinen‟s gross income for November was USD 103.09, based on 26 days of 
tapping at a daily rate of USD 2.50. He had to make the following deductions, but he 
also gained a premium. 
 
Base Salary USD 65  
Sunday Bonus x 2 USD 21  
Premium USD 28.09  
Gross Income USD 103.09  
Income Tax USD 1.23  
Bag of Rice USD 17.50 (not full bag) 
Hospital Fee USD 2.21 (Not entitled to 
free medical services) 
Net Income USD 82.15 
 
 
School. ”Free school” on the LAC plantation is limited to a maximum of four children 
plus an additional two if they have been born on the plantation. Yet, even if education is 
free for these children, their parents must still pay for their school uniforms. The price for 
this is currently USD 16 per uniform per year. The children of contractors can also 
attend plantation schools, but they are required to pay for the service as this is a private 
school.  
 
Private schools on the LAC plantation are owned and operated by the plantation. The 
LAC schools are generally recognized as among the best in Liberia (competing with the 
Firestone schools and other private schools for providing the best results in the 
country). At LAC, the current rate of tuition is USD 44 per child per year, for children 
over and above those for whom tuition is free.  
 
It is important to note that, outside plantations, Liberian parents are required to buy 
school uniforms for their children that attend school.  
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On Cocopa, there are five schools: two upper primaries and three lower primaries. On 
Cocopa, up to five dependents under the age of 18 are entitled to free school. 
 
Health Care. Basic health care is free, including giving birth and work-related accidents; 
for other services, fees apply. On Cocopa, dependents that qualify for free education 
also qualify for free medical treatment. For medical treatment of older family members, 
deductions are made from the worker‟s salary. However, if such expenses are very 
high, deductions are reportedly made over several months. Generally outside the 
plantations, Liberians pay for health services, which are known to be of relatively low 
quality. 
 
Subsidized Rice. The subsidized price of the bag of rice at LAC is USD 11 for the first 
bag (50kg), which is compulsory to purchase; and USD 23 for the second bag, which is 
voluntary. Contractors buy rice at the price of USD 23 USD. On Cocopa, the price for 
the first bag is USD 14; while additional bags can be purchased for USD 30, which was 
the market rate at the time of research.72 Information on prices and the subsidy system 
were confirmed by both managers and tappers at both plantations.  
 
 
Threat of Dismissal 
At both plantations, stories were shared of workers being subject to “quick dismissal” or 
dismissal without benefits, or workers being paid unequal amounts for the same type of 
work. These stories surfaced in approximately 50 percent of focus group sessions. 
Substantiation of these stories was difficult, as most were described by third-parties. 
 
 
Child Labor 
The issue of child labor ranks with quotas as a highly controversial matter on these 
plantations. As discussed above, at the Firestone plantation, reports established that 
quotas were so high that tappers were forced to involve household members and 
children in their production in order to fulfill them.73  
 
With regard to LAC and Cocopa, researchers observed some children working on the 
plantation with their parents. Research did not detect signs of the trafficking or forced 
labor of children. Researchers encountered a total number of ten older boys helping 
their fathers with their work (four at Cocopa and six at LAC), but this was after school 
hours, and only one boy seemed to be working full days.74  
 
The issue of child labor was not generally viewed as an issue of concern by 
respondents in this study. Because school quality is generally viewed as poor, and in 
some cases comes with associated fees, many parents feel that the best way to provide 
for their children is in fact to teach them skills in agriculture.  
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Dwellings, Sanitation, Education and Health 
Sanitation. At the Cocopa plantation, the main issue of concern to workers interviewed 
appeared to be the quality of worker dwellings, schools, the health center, water and 
sanitation. The latter in particular, is in dire need of investment and improvement. 
Latrines are in such poor condition that many workers refuse to use them and make 
their toilet in the bush surrounding the workers‟ quarters instead. This is clearly 
unsustainable, and will eventually lead to the spread of disease.75  
 
Housing and Health Centers. Housing at both plantations is free, built for workers as 
single-family homes and generally larger than what is available to Liberians off the 
plantations. However, the quality differs considerably between the two plantations. 
Based on the experience of the researchers, it can be said that housing conditions at 
LAC are fair and on the higher end of the spectrum relative to what most people in 
Liberia experience. Houses have iron roofs, are made of brick and have multiple rooms; 
most also have separate corners with iron roofs for cooking. When used, these facilities 
have the potential to significantly reduce the risk of fires from cooking; however, most 
families seem to prefer to prepare their food outside their dwellings.  
 
At Cocopa, the living quarters are overcrowded and in urgent need of repair, especially 
the roofs. The water quality is poor, particularly during the rainy season. At the time of 
research, management had only recently assumed control of the plantation, after years 
of mismanagement and neglect. Research indicated that Cocopa will require massive 
investment in rubber trees, and also in housing, latrines, clean water, and in its health 
center in order to be fully and sustainably operational. With regard to the health center, 
the building is new, but as indicated by the union representative, “buildings are one 
thing, what‟s in them another matter.” According to the doctor working in the health 
center, it is currently both understaffed and lacks medicine. 
 
Education and Schools. Schools on the plantations operate as private schools within the 
educational system of Liberia and follow its ordinary primary and secondary education 
schedule. They are owned by the plantations and established to meet the needs of the 
children of plantation employees. As noted above, the children of contract workers can 
also attend the schools if their parents pay the school fee. 
 
At LAC there are elementary, junior high and senior high schools. According to the 
superintendent of the LAC schools, a total 4,556 children are enrolled in the LAC school 
system. This suggests, based on the total population of 25,000 people, that there must 
be children on the plantation who are not enrolled in school. This issue warrants further 
investigation, as researchers were unable to obtain a population register of the 
plantation showing a breakdown of the population by age and gender. 
 
Based on information provided during interviews, the quality of LAC schools is generally 
considered to be good, and according to the school superintendent, attendance rates 
are very high. No attendance statistics were available however. When researchers 
visited the schools at LAC, they looked busy but not overcrowded. As previously 
mentioned, LAC competes with the Firestone and other private schools in producing the 
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best results in the country.76 The school system also provides four annual scholarships 
to the University of Liberia for LAC graduates. A concern raised both by the union 
representative and in several of the focus groups was the lack of a technical high school 
targeting the needs of the rubber sector. 
 
In contrast to LAC, the Cocopa schools have suffered from the same amount of neglect 
as the rest of the plantation. One school building is quite new and looks fine from the 
outside, but it is overcrowded and lacks teaching materials. There were also several 
concerns expressed about the quality of some teachers. It was not possible to find out 
how many children were enrolled or regularly attended school at Cocopa. In theory 
there should be one stipend per year for a Cocopa graduate to attend the University of 
Liberia, but according to the union representative, it has not been handed out for 
several years. This suggests that the practice stopped sometime during the civil war or 
Taylor years. 
 
 
Table 7: Perceptions of housing, education and the health center 
 LAC Cocopa 
(Number of (Number of 
respondents) respondents) 
Housing (decent) 36 4 
Housing (bad) 32 26 
Sanitation and water (decent) 40 - 
Sanitation and water (bad) 28 30 
Education (decent) 43 5 
Education (bad) 25 25 
Health center (decent) 41 3 
Health center (bad) 27 27 
 
In sum, the perspectives of the LAC workers interviewed is that their dwellings, 
education and health facilities are generally poor; and they are concerned about the 
relationship between the quotas and cash benefits they receive. Workers at Cocopa are 
primarily concerned with the low quality of their housing, educational and health 
facilities, but seem somewhat more satisfied with their quota system.  
 
 
Security 
At both plantations, but more so at Cocopa, a number of workers expressed concern 
about insecurity and the risk of armed robbers seeking to steal rubber. These concerns 
were expressed despite the presence of a small security force at both plantations. This 
is a significant issue, with armed robbers arriving at night. It is also a complex issue, as 
there is some difference of opinion about whether this is a matter for private plantation 
security to manage or for the government to control as part of its general public safety 
and security responsibilities. (Liberia already has considerable private security forces, 
which is perceived by many as problematic for various reasons.) The issue is further 
complicated by concern that a strong private security force on the plantation could be 
used against workers during strikes or other worker-management conflicts. 
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Health and Safety 
The major occupational health issues on both plantations, according to data collected, 
are back pain and muscle cramps. This is not a surprise given that working as a tapper 
is hard physical labor, involving the need to carry loads weighing up to 150 pounds. 
Cases of back pain reported to the hospital at LAC were more common among older 
workers. 
 
Skin infections are another common concern. Work-related accidents mainly result from 
cuts received while cutting the bush with a machete, and from wounds and infections 
caused by hot rubber that has melted on the skin. Workers also risk eye damage while 
working, with an average of five cases reported to the hospital each month.  
 
Table 8. Safety and security: exposure to work-related 
danger & accidents last year 
 LAC Cocopa 
(Number of (Number of 
respondents) respondents) 
Robbery/theft 4 15 
Snakebites 3 8 
Eye damage from latex 2 6 
Skin damage from latex 8 
77
23  
Back pains 68 30 
Muscle cramps 68 30 
Skin damage from acid 5 19 
 
 
Management at both plantations reported that all workers are routinely supplied with 
adequate protective gear such as boots; brown dresses/gowns/aprons to be worn over 
their clothes; and gloves for their hands and goggles to protect their eyes from the acid 
of latex.  
 
At LAC most employees reported that they are supplied with this gear, and most of 
them reported using the rubber boots. Contractors and sub-contractors also reported 
using rubber boots, as these protect not 
only against damage from the latex and 
the acid used, but also from snake bites. 
Protective clothing appeared to be less 
commonly used among employees, 
contractors and sub-contractors alike. 
According to interviews, there are several 
Most workers at LAC use rubber boots 
reasons for this: Rubber boots may be 
lost, stolen or sold if they are not worn, 
while some of the other equipment is 
seen by some as impractical for fieldwork 
when workers wish to work as swiftly and 
effectively as possible.  
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At Cocopa, access to protective gear, including rubber boots, is more haphazard as a 
lot of such equipment was lost during the chaotic years at the plantation and not all of 
what was lost has been replaced. 
 
Some respondents suggested that a way to combat frequent skin and eye damage 
would be to consult with workers on the functionality of the protective gear and make 
adjustments if necessary, so that the gear would be viewed as more practical. Research 
did not detect that there are current efforts by management to enforce or incentivize the 
wearing of such personal protective equipment.  
 
At LAC, the quality of the health center is quite good, but the doctor working there 
reported several problems that relate to working and living conditions. One important 
problem is malnutrition of small children. This is partly related to the fact that mothers 
only receive two months of paid leave after giving birth. This means that they return to 
work after two months and, in order to make a decent wage, they leave their small 
children behind in the villages on the plantations. This keeps them from breastfeeding 
infants at an early age. This leads to many children becoming malnourished and 
contracting diarrhea, and contributes to under-five mortality. Contractors also tend to 
leave their sickbed too early as they only receive payment when they work. In contrast, 
the doctor also reported that employees often preferred to stay as long as possible in 
the hospital, at least in part because they receive sick pay.  
 
With regard to common types of illnesses, interviews with the doctor, her staff and a 
review of hospital records suggested that the main cause of sickness and death at LAC, 
as elsewhere in Liberia, is malaria and diarrhea. LAC does not distribute mosquito nets 
to employees, and the hospital receives only a limited supply from the county 
government.78  
 
 
Social Security and Pensions 
Plantations are part of rural Liberia, but different from it. They constitute sites of 
agricultural activity, but offer a sense of urban life. They lie somewhere in between, 
being rural and urban at the same time. They represent a working life, but also a family 
life, until you reach the age of retirement or you can no longer work.79 
 
Research indicated that if a retired worker has family members that continue to work on 
the plantation and agree to take care of that person, then the retired worker may stay; if 
not, retired workers are supposed to leave the plantation and return to their home of 
origin. After having received all final benefits a retiree is entitled to, the retiree will have 
15 days to leave the plantation.  
 
LAC is part of the Liberian Social Security system, meaning that the pension from LAC 
is supposed to be paid through this government body. This is not the case for Cocopa 
which pays its pensioners directly every month. The extent to which the Social Security 
system actually works, and whether Cocopa is able to reach its pensioners every 
month, is another issue. Due to constraints of time and resources it was not possible for 
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the team of researchers to investigate this in systematic detail, but in conversations with 
the workers, this issue was rarely raised as a major concern.80  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This report has presented background information on Liberia and the rubber sector, the 
exploratory methodology that was developed to study working conditions – with special 
attention to forced labor indicators –  on two company-owned rubber plantations in 
Liberia, and the findings yielded by the study. The findings presented herein are not 
statistically representative of Liberia or the rubber sector, and this report does not claim 
to determine the existence of forced labor or the scale of exploitative working conditions 
in Liberia. However, the report does provide an overview of working and living 
conditions of concern uncovered amongst rubber plantation workers on two rubber 
plantations in Liberia. 
 
The relationship between quotas and cash under which a minimum fixed daily wage is 
tied to the completion of a pre-established quota is clearly an issue at both LAC and 
Cocopa. Workers who do not fulfill the quota may experience a financial penalty. But, as 
noted in the report, at the time of research, the majority of interviewed workers reported 
being satisfied with the level of the quota; with a greater proportion of older workers 
expressing dissatisfaction. Workers regularly work 12 hour days on both plantations.  
 
Research found evidence of loan taking on LAC but not Cocopa. This debt did not 
appear to bind workers to the workplace.  
 
The primary concerns of workers interviewed at Cocopa included housing, education 
and sanitation. Sanitation, in particular, has reached a crisis point at Cocopa. Based on 
research findings, there is also a need at both LAC and Cocopa for improved monitoring 
of safety and health standards and better mechanisms for protecting workers from work 
hazards: snakebites, skin burns and eye injuries are relatively frequent. Child labor is 
present on both plantations: researchers observed some children (ten in all) working 
with their parents, after school hours. Concern about the risk of the armed robbery of 
rubber by bandits was present at both plantations.  
 
Contract workers interviewed for this study, and in particular sub-contractors, reported 
much less favorable conditions.  
 
Lessons Learned 
A key lesson learned in this exploratory research is that investigating working conditions 
in the rubber sector of Liberia, a sector that provides critical employment for an 
impoverished country, must be done with due consideration toward protecting the 
workers on the plantations and preserving livelihood opportunities. This is particularly 
the case in light of ongoing economic and social changes, such as the potential 
transition of some plantations to palm oil production.  
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This study indicates that more research into working conditions is necessary and 
warranted. Further research should combine qualitative and quantitative methods, 
encompass all large-scale company-owned rubber plantations if possible, and include 
livelihood studies of communities living and working outside the plantations. A similar 
study of smallholder production of rubber should also be undertaken. This would enable 
greater understanding of the differences between life on plantations and general living 
conditions in rural Liberia. It is hoped that the current report will act as a foundation for 
further research and to inspire discussion that can lead to a more nuanced 
understanding of conditions on rubber plantations in the country. 
 
The issue of quotas should be addressed in this larger-scale research. Inclusion of all 
company-owned plantations in a research sample would be essential to understanding 
the impact of quotas on the ability of Liberia‟s rubber workers to earn a fair wage, under 
fair and legal working conditions. The issue of debt-taking should also be explored in a 
larger scale study, among both plantation workers and smallholders.  
 
Plantations in Liberia rely on an informal and casually-employed workforce to 
supplement formal employment. This results in less-favorable employment conditions 
for these workers compared to those available to formal employees on the plantation. 
This raises the question of whether the workforce could be expanded; and independent 
analysis of this should be conducted.  
 
It remains a distinct possibility that an increasing number of rubber plantations will 
transfer to palm oil production, a process that is significantly less labor intensive and, 
therefore, would result in lay-offs across the sector. Research is warranted into the labor 
rights and livelihood consequences of this transition.  
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Appendix 1: Early History and Legacy of War in Liberia  
 
During the period from 1980 to 2003, Liberia became synonymous with war, chaos and 
destruction, yet the underlying causes of conflict are deeply entrenched in Liberian 
history. Liberia consists of 16 major ethnic and cultural groups, each with its own 
traditions, customs, religion, languages and dialects. Furthermore, in order to 
understand the history of state formation in the country, one must also consider the 
group of freed slaves who went to Liberia from the United States between 1822 and 
1861. These freed slaves established the Republic of Liberia and became known as the 
Americo-Liberians. Their intention was to create a safe haven for freed slaves. Given 
the land to govern, however, they built a system of rule on the only political and 
administrative system they were familiar with: the system of plantations in the southern 
US. The main difference in this case was that they were now considered “masters” and 
the indigenous people were treated as “servants.” Trapped in this model, they 
embarked on a political strategy of division between themselves – perceived as a 
civilized and educated class – and the others – perceived as a savage, native 
underclass. This worldview strongly influenced living and working conditions on the 
rubber plantations that were established in the Liberia during the 1920s. 
 
When the Republic of Liberia was established in 1847, a constitution based on the US 
model was adopted. According to this constitution, all men are born free and 
independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights. However, “all 
men,” in this case, did not mean everyone inhabiting the area over which the 
constitution governed; this founding document made a strong distinction between the 
Americo-Liberians and the indigenous population. Members of the so-called “native 
tribes” were not eligible for election or voting. A firm division between the two groups 
was institutionalized, laying a foundation for entrenched alienation between different 
ethnic groups in Liberia, and between these groups and a new upper class constituted 
by the Americo-Liberians. In 1870, the True Whig Party (TWP) was established, and for 
the next 110 years Liberia was a de facto one-party state. 
 
By the early 1920s, the Americo-Liberians had secured their rule through a combination 
of force and arrangements based on clientelism. A complex system of hierarchical 
patron-client relationships (with Americo-Liberians at the top) maintained what can be 
characterized as “settler rule.” This system remained more-or-less in place until riots 
broke out in April 1979 against then President William Tolbert and his regime. In 
response, Tolbert declared a state of emergency and suppressed the riots with full 
force. Most leaders of the small and fragmented opposition were arrested. However, 
only two days before their cases were due to be heard in court, a group of 17 enlisted 
men killed Tolbert, overthrew the government and executed several ministers at the 
beach in Monrovia. Much of the population supported the coup, hoping that it would 
usher in a new era in Liberia where people would indeed be treated equally. 
 
However, it soon became obvious that the soldiers, under the leadership of Samuel 
Doe, were not able or willing to reform the Liberian state. On the contrary, they became 
captives themselves of the predatory logic of the state established by the Americo-
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Liberians. Doe‟s almost ten years in power are a story of petty corruption, theft of state 
resources, murder, rape, torture and other human rights abuses. As social tensions 
increased, the country was ripe for civil war. This conflict began on Christmas Eve 1989 
when the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), a small rebel army led by Charles 
Taylor, crossed over the border from Côte d‟Ivoire. 
 
No one knows how many people died in the first part of the Liberian civil war, which 
lasted from 1990 to 1997. Some say 60,000 while others claim deaths as high as 
250,000. The first estimate is probably more realistic; however, what is clear is that the 
level of human suffering created by the war was enormous, and that the war spilled over 
into other West African countries. The consequences of this civil conflict – including 
refugee flows, political and economic destabilization, and the creation of new military 
alliances – could be identified in Burkina Faso, Côte d‟Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, 
Nigeria and Sierra Leone. 
 
Between 1994 and 1996, several attempts to implement a peace agreement in Liberia 
failed, mainly because of the unwillingness of Nigeria to accept a deal that included 
Charles Taylor. However, in 1996, Taylor and then Nigerian ruler Sani Abacha reached 
an agreement, and elections were held in July of that year. In relatively free and fair 
elections that were supervised by international election observers, Taylor won 
approximately 75% of the vote. The main reason for this is that Taylor‟s movement was 
the best organized and most ethnically diverse of the armed factions, and that civilian 
opposition was too fragmented and disorganized to put up a real challenge to him. 
 
From 1997 to 2000, the situation in most parts of Liberia was relatively calm. However, 
in the northern territory of Lofa County, instability and low-level conflict continued and by 
1999 the second phase of the civil war began. Three years later Taylor‟s enemies in the 
rebel factions – Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the 
Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) – brought the war back to Monrovia. As 
West African peace talks failed to yield any tangible result, the summer of 2003 turned 
into a disaster for the inhabitants and internally displaced peoples of the capital. This 
continued until Taylor surrendered and accepted a Nigerian offer of exile on 11 August 
2003. 
 
When President Charles Taylor went into exile, power was first transferred to his Vice-
President, Moses Blah, before the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) 
was established under the leadership of Gyude Bryant, which set out to steer Liberia 
through a two-year transition phase agreed upon in the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA). Together with UNMIL, the NTGL managed to conduct relatively free 
and fair elections in the autumn of 2005 which brought to power Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. 
This transition period, however, created new problems and challenges that continue to 
haunt Liberia today. 
 
The main problem was the composition of the NTGL. In many respects, it was not much 
different from previous power-sharing arrangements. Like other Liberian governments, 
the NTGL was highly competitive and patrimonial, with various elites locked in struggles 
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over state resources. A small number of representatives from the private sector and civil 
society were included in the NTGL, but by-and-large the transitional government 
reflected the prevailing balance of power between the three rival military factions: 
Taylor‟s government army, LURD and MODEL. This meant that real power in the NTGL 
sat with members of the former warring factions. 
 
LURD and MODEL had won the war, but these groups could not win the peace. LURD 
was a Mandingo-dominated group, which could not win a national election. Similarly, the 
Krahn were a small ethnic group that remained marked by what many Liberians 
believed were favored group status under Samuel Doe‟s dictatorship. Their interest in 
the NTGL was therefore not in transition as such; but as an opportunity for enrichment 
before multi-party elections would consign them to minority political status. Acutely 
aware of this, faction leaders openly traded in NTGL positions, selling them to the 
highest bidder. This is the legacy that Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf‟s government continues to 
struggle with as Liberia prepares for a second period of her presidency.  
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Appendix 2: Guiding Questions for Field Research  
 
The following questions shall serve as a guide for semi-structured interviews, life-history 
approaches, and focus group discussions: 
 Production chain at rubber plantation: what are the different tasks involved in 
rubber production? Who is conducting the different tasks? What input is needed 
at every stage in the production chain?  
 What is the organizational structure of the rubber plantation? How many levels of 
management? Who (roles/positions, not names of individuals) are responsible for 
supervision at the different levels? Who are responsible for security? 
 What are the working conditions for the workers involved in different parts of the 
rubber production?  
o How many hours per day, days per week do they work? Do they have a 
quota they need to fill within a certain time period? What is the quota? 
What happens if they don‟t reach their quota?  
o What wages do they earn? How are their wages determined? Are wages 
fixed or according to amount of rubber tapped? Does it happen that their 
wages are withheld/not being paid? How often and for what reason? How 
often are they paid? Are wages sometimes delayed? Are new workers 
paid from when they start or is there a period of training with reduced or 
no pay? If yes, for how long and on which conditions? 
o Do the workers receive additional benefits to paid wages, such as 
housing, food, schooling (themselves or their children), health assistance, 
or other? 
o Are the workers exposed to health hazards, such as working with 
pesticides, cuts from machetes, etc.? Do they use any protective gear, 
such as masks, gloves, rubber boots, etc.? What happens if they are 
injured? Do they get health treatment (free or for charge), do they receive 
payment/compensation if they cannot work due to work injury? 
o What kind of training do the workers receive?  
 Are there occurrences where workers have experienced threats (of withhold 
payment, loss of employment, physical violence towards themselves or their 
families, sexual abuse, loss of deposit, withdrawal of necessities such as food or 
housing, of having to work longer hours, do more dangerous work, reduced 
wages, higher quotas, etc.) or the actual occurrence of any of the above? 
 Do the workers hold debt to anyone involved in their recruitment to the work or 
involved in organizing their work? If yes, what is the nature of their debt, how 
much, to whom do they owe money/work, what are the conditions of down 
payment, what happens if they are not able/willing to pay? Is it a personal debt or 
have they inherited it from other family members? 
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 Who are the workers involved in the different tasks at the plantation (gender, 
age, ethnic belonging, migrants/non-migrants, etc.) 
 How are the workers recruited? Where are they recruited, by whom? Do they pay 
middlemen in any process of the recruitment? Are there occurrences where 
workers end up doing other tasks than the ones they were promised? Are there 
occurrences where workers get different conditions than they were promised 
(longer hours, lower wages, more dangerous work tasks, other contract 
conditions, etc.) 
 Are the workers able to leave at any time if prospect for another job comes up? If 
no, why not? (Quotas to fill, contract obligations, debt for recruitment, housing, 
food provision, other?) 
 Are the workers organized through a labor union? Do they have contracts for 
their employment? If yes, what are the terms of their contracts? 
 How are conflicts, for instance between workers and management, solved? Who 
are involved in resolving disputes? 
 Are the workers and their conditions affected by external events such as 
fluctuations in the price of rubber, changed ownership of plantation, conflict vs. 
post-conflict situation, or other factors? 
 How are the living conditions for the workers at the plantations? What are their 
housing conditions (space, water, sanitation, electricity, etc.), do they own or rent 
their houses, how much do they pay in rent? Do they have access to health 
facilities? Do they have access to school for their children?  
 How do the workers experience that their situation has changed over time and 
what do they believe to be the causes of these changes? 
 
Field researchers should also be participant observers and use their skills as 
independent researchers to detect conditions of concern that are not mentioned directly 
in interviews. Such observations can include: 
 Workers showing signs of physical maltreatment, for instance bruises 
 Workers being anxious to talk about their conditions 
 Supervisors demonstrating violent behavior 
 Workers not being allowed to leave the workplace 
 Barbed wire, armed guards around the workplace 
 Workers receiving threats or abuse 
 Workers not receiving their wages 
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Appendix 3: Donor Assistance to Liberia, 2004-200781 
 
 
 
Not captured in the table above are non-African and African emerging partners active in 
Liberia. China, the largest non-African partner, provides an estimated USD 20 million 
annually to Liberia to build infrastructure and improve healthcare and education. Nigeria 
and Libya are also present in Liberia, and plan investments in mobile phone banking, 
hotel, and rubber production.82 
 
The World Food Program (WFP), the second largest donor in Liberia, focuses on school 
meals and helping smallholder farmers to rehabilitate agricultural assets with a focus on 
rice production. The WFP also provides food assistance to mothers and children at risk 
of malnutrition, TB patients and people living with HIV.83 The World Bank, another major 
donor in Liberia, has twenty-four active projects in the country focused on electricity, 
financial management reform, roads, sanitation, education, infrastructure, agriculture 
and capacity building.84 
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